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Abstract: 
In this paper, we approach financial crises from two different aspects: Prevention 
and Management. Prevention from crises, here sudden stops, will be carried out 
through international reserves accumulation (Jeanne & Rancière model, 2006). 
The section of crises management will be undertaken by an International Lender 
of last Resort (ILOLR), here the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Our study 
shows that under an optimal level of international reserves, countries should resort 
to international lending, but the efficiency of this latter depends on countries’ 
eligibility, i.e their external, budget and financial sustainability.  
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1-Introduction 
Over the last decades, we have noticed a significant recovery of international reserves held by 
emerging markets, especially in Asia. This has raised the issue of the optimal level of 
international reserves in emerging markets. However, the setting of this level needs a normative 
reference. In this paper, we have used the model developed by Jeanne & Rancière in 2006. This 
reserves’ accumulation represents an efficient way for emerging markets to face financial crisis, 
especially sudden stops. But if the country becomes aware that the reserves held are less than 
their optimal level, national authorities have to counterbalance this lack and find sources of 
international reserves. One of these sources is the International Lending of Last Resort, a role 
played nowadays by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).   
So once the optimal level of reserves assessed, it becomes relevant to imagine the 
scenario in which this level is higher than the one really held by the country’s central bank. In 
this case, the higher crisis’ probability calls for the intervention of an International Lender Of 
Last Resort (ILOLR), i.e the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to recent literature, 
the efficiency of this intervention is closely related to some ex ante conditions. At this stage, 
one should assess countries’ sustainability, especially key sectors of ex ante conditionality: 
external, fiscal and financial, in order to determine if the country is eligible or not to a potential 
credit line of the IMF. This evaluation will allow us to set efficiency conditions of an ILOLR 
thanks to an innovative method: Classification And Regression Tree (CART). 
In this paper, we will first present a model of optimal reserves. Accumulation of 
exchange reserves represents in fact the “solution of first resort” against financial crises (Crises 
prevention). If country’s reserves decrease under its optimal level, authorities have to look for 
an international loan of last resort. The efficiency of such loans depends on the country’s 
external, fiscal and financial sustainability. An assessment of this latter is conducted in the 
second part of this paper using a non- parametric methodology (Classification and Regression 
Tree). 
 
2- Literature Review: 
The literature related to the use of international reserves as a measure of a country’s 
vulnerability is abundant and dates back to the 40’s :   Triffin (1947, 1960), Heller (1966), 
Frenkel (1978, 1983), Polak (1970), Oliviera (1971), Officer (1976), Williamson (1973), 
Grimes (1973), Heller & Khan (1978), Lizondo & Mathieson (1987), Eichengreen & Frenkel 
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(1996), IMF (1953, 2000), De Beaufort and Wijnholds (1977, 2001), Jeanne and Rancière 
(2006), Jeanne (2007), Kim (2008)... But the litterature before the 90’s was totally defined in 
terms of trade, mainly imports. This litterature was criticized especialy beacuse of the lack of a 
guideline of th eoptimal level of reserves for a country. 
The notion of « reserves adequacy » has changed with the occurrence of the financial 
crises of the 90’s (Calvo 1996, Frankel et Rose, 1996 ; Sachs, Tornell et Velasco, 1996). These 
crises have triggered the need of holding reserves adequacy ratios in order to include the 
vulnerability of emerging countries’ balance of payments (IMF, 2000 and 2001 ; Bussière and 
Mulder, 1999 ; Mulder, 2000, Jeanne (2007), Chang and Velasco, 2001, Aizenman and Lee, 
2005, Krugman, 1979 ; Flood and Garber, 1984, Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001). More 
recent papers have tried to assess the optimal level of reserves for emerging countries with a 
high sudden stops risk (Aizenman and Lee, 2005 ; Caballero and Panageas, 2004 ; Garcia and 
Soto, 2004) 
In general, the literature adopted two alternative ways to assess the optimal level of 
reserves for a country. The first uses reserves adequacy indicators : Rodrik and Velasco (1999), 
Bussière and Mulder (1999) , Willett and al. (2004), Greenspan (1999), De Beaufort Wijnholds 
and Kapteyn (2001), Soto and al. (2004), De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001), Kim and 
al. (2005), Shcherbakov (2002), Redrado and al. (2006), Li and Rajan (2005), Skala, Thimann 
and Wölfinger (2007), Beck and Rahbari (2008). The second way uses econometries 
techniques, usually called « optimal reserves analysis »  because they assume that the level of 
reserves should be proportional to the optimal level plus an error term non correlated with the 
other explaining (Aizenman et Marion, 2003) 
According to Jeanne & Rancière (2006), few studies have tried to quantify the level of 
reserves that a country has to hold to face balance of payment’s chocks. The model of optimal 
exchange reserves developed by Jeanne & Rancière (2006) has tried to overcome this 
insufficiency.   
The authors explained that political authorities have often used rules with quantitative 
thresholds, because of lack of an appropriate normative quantitative framework. The most 
common used rule is the maintenance of a level of reserves equivalent to three months of 
imports. A more recent rule, “Greenspan- Guidotti” rule, consists in holding reserves that totally 
cover the external short term debt.    
In this paper, we will start by briefly presenting the model developed by Jeanne & 
Rancière in 2006, we will use the formula of the authors in order to reckon the optimal level of 
international reserves for emerging countries from 1975- 2012. This period includes recent 
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years during which most of countries faced financial turmoils due to the 2008 international 
financial crisis. Thus, our results will be compared to Jeanne & Rancière ones to see the impact 
of the recent crisis. As the authors, first, the probability of crises, one of useful variables of the 
model, will be computed as an unconditional probability. Then, this probability will be 
estimated on the basis of several fundamentals.   
 
According to Guidotti & al. (2004), Jeanne & Rancière identify a sudden stop for the 
year t if the ratio of capital inflows in relation to GDP, kt = KAt/Yt , falls than more than 5% of 
the GDP in relation to the previous year, i.e kt < kt-1 – 5%. 
Starting from this point, we have tried to detect episodes of sudden stops for 41 emerging 
and developing countries on the period 1975- 2012. Seeing that data are annual, we could get 
the more recent values, thanks essentially to online databases like the World Economic Outlook 
of the IMF, while data ends in 2003 for Jeanne & Rancière. Our results are presented in the 
table of Appendix 1. 
 
Jeanne & Rancière have considered a little opened country which could face a sudden 
stop of capital inflows. The country holds reserves in order to smooth the sudden stop impact 
on domestic absorption. The authors have first presented the main hypotheses of their model 
and derived than a closed expression of reserves optimal level.   
 The authors showed that the optimal level of reserves in normal times is a fixed fraction 
of output level: Rt = ρ Yt+1b  
The optimal ratio of reserves in relation to output ρ is given by the following expression: 
ρ = λ + γ -  𝐩𝟏/𝛔–𝟏𝟏ା( 𝐩𝟏/𝛔–𝟏)(𝟏ି𝛅ି𝛑) [ 1- 𝒓ି𝒈𝟏ା𝒈 λ – (δ+π)(λ+γ)]           (1) 
Equation (1) represents the formula of optimal level of reserves according to Jeanne & 
Rancière model.  Where : 
- π  : The non conditional sudden stop probability (number of years of crisis/ Total 
number of years); 
- γ  : The ratio of output loss (difference between growth rates during calm and crisis 
periods); 
- λ  : The ratio of short term debt in relation to GDP; 
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- r : The reserves return (average of US 3-month T-bills of the last 10 years; 
- δ  : The term premium (difference between T-Bonds and Fed Funds rates); 
- σ  : The risk aversion; 
- g: The real GDP growth. 
 
 
3- Methodology and data: Application of Jeanne & Rancière Model for 
the period 1975- 2012: 
 
As Jeanne & Rancière, we have tried to calibrate the model using the same sample of 
sudden stops obtained in the previous section. To do this, we have built a benchmark calibration 
on the basis of the sudden stop average of our sample.  
 
Definitions of all parameters as well as data sources are given in the appendix 2. The results of 
our benchmark calibration are summarized in the table below: 
 
Table 1. Results of benchmark calibration of the 7 parameters  
Parameter   Values Interval of changes 
π  Non- conditional crisis probability 0.24 [0,0.55] 
 λ Sudden Stop size 0.14 [0.06,0.54] 
r Return of reserves 0.033 [0,0.19] 
δ Term premium 0.015 [-0.025,0.035] 
g Average of real GDP growth 0.045 [0.012,0.093] 
σ Risk aversion 2 [1,10] 
ϒ Output loss 0.041 [0,0.19] 
 
Parameters π, λ and γ have been calibrated using arithmetic averages of our sample (cf. 
previous section) for the period 1975- 2012.   
 
The parameter λ has been calibrated as the average level of (kt-1- kt) of our sample, i.e 
the sudden stop size. This parameter reaches hence 14% per year in average.  
We noticed that the unconditional probability of a sudden stop (π) for our sample is 
quite high (24% per year), much higher than Jeanne & Rancière one (10.2% per year). This can 
be explained by the fact that the period we studied includes more crises episodes, especially 
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those related to the international financial crisis of 2007- 2008. The period studied by Jeanne & 
Rancière ends in 2003.    
The output cost γ has also been calibrated using the difference average between GDP 
growth rate in normal times and GDP growth rate really observed during the sudden stop. We 
have noticed that the growth rate declines by 2.6% in average following a sudden stop, and by 
1.7% during the year following the sudden stop. We have hence set the parameter γ at 4.3% in 
our benchmark calibration. 
The short term non-risky rate r is set at 3.3%. It consists in the average of US 3-months 
Treasury bills of the last ten years of the studied period, i.e between 2002 and 2012.  
The term premium δ is the average difference between US 10-years Treasury bonds and 
the federal fund rate. According to this definition, the parameter δ is set up at 1.5.   
  The GDP growth g reaches 4.5% for our sample (out of crises periods). Finally, the 
risk aversion is set up at 2%, i.e its standard value in the literature related to growth and business 
cycles (Jeanne & Rancière, 2006).  
Using the formula developed by Jeanne & Rancière (equation 1) for our sample of 
countries during the period 1975- 2008, the optimal level of reserves is set up at 13,5% of GDP. 
Certainly, this level is close to the observed level of our sample between 1975 and 2012 (12%), 
but it is highly lower than the one observed during the more recent period 2000- 2012, when it 
reached 18% of the GDP in average. This goes in line with our starting idea: Emerging markets 
tend to accumulate too much exchange reserves in relation to their needs. Even accumulation 
seems to be understandable seeing the financial crises that hit emerging markets during the late 
90’s, but this abundance can create costs.   
Now, we will reckon once again the optimal level of exchange reserves of the same 
countries, replacing the non-conditional crises probability, π, by a probability that we will 
estimate thanks to a Probit model. 
 
First, we will assess an empirical equation for the sudden stop probability π, based on a 
set of countries’ fundamentals and a Probit model.  
Here, the probability of a sudden stop depends on countries’ economics fundamentals. 
It consists in a Probit Model of our 41 countries sample, between 1975 and 2012. 
Explaining variables used in our estimation are related to five sectors:    
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1- Debt variables: short term debt and public debt (related to GDP); 
2- Exchange variables: real exchange rate over- valuation and exchange regimes; 
3- Financial variables: US interest rates and their changes, financial openness (capital 
inflows, total of capital inflows and outflows, foreign direct investments, external 
liabilities and Net Foreign Assets); country’s financial  development (bank deposits, 
M2 and M2 multiplier, M3, stock exchange capitalization and credits to private 
sector); 
4- Variables related to external trade (trade openness, terms of trade); 
5-  Variables of economic cycle: Real GDP growth and real credit growth.  
 
We have collected 23 potential variables (cf. Appendix 2). All explaining variables have 
been delayed by one year. Then, we have eliminated the less significant variables from our 
estimation (general to specific approach, see Jeanne & Rancière, 2006). Our results are 
summarized in the Table 2. It appears that the sudden stop probability decreases with national 
GDP and the sum of capital inflows and outflows. This probability increases with capital 
inflows. 
   
Table 2. Probit estimation of Sudden Stops crises 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. Z Proba. 
Capital Inflows 8.955 1.854 4.83 0.000* 
Capital Inflows and Outflows  -4.550 1.057 -4.30 0.000* 
Real GDP Growth  -2.010 1.204 -1.67 0.095** 
Constant -0.907 0.127 -7.13 0.000* 
Sources: International Financial Statistics, IMF 
* : Significant at 5% ; ** : Significant at 10% 
 
These results are consistent with the crises theory. A sustainable economic growth helps 
countries facing sudden stops crises. This situation reflects in fact country’s sound situation. 
For foreign investors, this reflects the ability of the country to face potential contagion. The 
resistance of the major emerging countries, like China, India or Brazil with their  substantial 
annual growth rates during 2008 international financial crisis, is a perfect example for this idea.  
But the interpretation of the two other significant variables is not so obvious and direct. 
Indeed, both variables represent financial integration (or openness) degree of the country. The 
variable “capital inflows” appears with a positive sign, while the sum of inflows and outflows 
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is negative. The impact of financial integration degree on crises occurrence appears 
consequently unclear. The effect depends on the quality and the duration of foreign capitals, 
which determines in fine the vulnerability degree of a country facing a potential situation 
reversal.    
As Jeanne & Rancière, we have assessed the impact of fundamentals’ change on the 
optimal level of reserves of our “reference country”. To do this, our benchmark economy is 
calibrated as an average intermediate- level country, whose fundamentals are initially set up at 
the sample average.   
           
Table 3. Sudden Stop Probability 
  Average values  
Estimated 
Coef.   
  of the sample of variables   
    
Inflows 0.074 8.95515 0.666 
Total of inflows and 
outflows 0.0995 -4.549308 -0.4529 
Real GDP growth 0.0437 -2.009356 -0.087 
    
Total   0.125 
Constant   -0.906 
Z   -0.7809 
Probability     0.217 
 
where Z = 8.9551 * (Average of « Capital inflows ») – 4.5493 * (Average of « Capital 
Inflows and Outflows » ) -2.0093 * (Average of Real GDP Growth ) – 0.9067 
The Probit data gives a sudden stop probability of 22% for our average economy, versus 
24% in the case of non- conditional probability. When applying Jeanne & Rancière formula 1, 
this probability gives a ratio of 13.3% of optimal reserves in relation to GDP.  
Then, we have analyzed the effect of a change in each significant variable (or 
fundamental) on the estimated probability of a sudden stop, and consequently on the optimal 
ratio of reserves.  
We have computed hence the marginal impact of the statistically significant variables 
on this economy with average features. Results are shown in the table below:  
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Table 4. Marginal Impact of significant variables on a the Sudden stop 
probability   
Variable dF/dx Std. Err. Z Proba. 
Capital Inflows 2,6604 0,8123 3,26 0,001 
Capital Inflows and Outflows  -1,3411 0,4335 -3,08 0,002 
Real GDP Growth  -0,8438 0,3307 -2,54 0,011 
 
According to the first colon of table 4, the probability of crises seems to be highly 
sensitive vis-a-vis variables changes. Hence, a slight increase of 1% in GDP growth reduces the 
crisis probability by 84%. Variables related to international financial integration are even more 
sensitive: a rise of 1% in capital inflows increases sharply the crisis risk (by 266%), while the 
same rise in capital inflows and outflows decreases this probability by 134%. 
We should notice that these estimations are related to an average, in other words to an 
imaginary economy. It would be highly interesting to study a particular country, especially the 
impact of its fundamentals’ changes on the probability of crises.   
Holding important international reserves represents indeed the solution of first resort 
when a country faces a crisis. The recourse to the IMF, considered as a solution of last resort, 
is considered when a country faces a hardening of its exchange reserves (lower than the optimal 
one). 
 
Financial Crisis’ Management : Optimality conditions for a Bailout 
from an International Lender of Last Resort : 
Before lending liquidity, the ILOR must test country’s eligibility. According to recent 
literature, assessing eligibility is a condition for the efficiency of the ILOR intervention: it 
includes external, fiscal and financial sustainability. These conditions, called ex ante 
conditionality, needs eligibility rules in order to help the ILOLR (now the IMF) to distinguish 
between illiquid and insolvent countries. These rules have to be quantitative, like Maastricht 
ones. This would speed bailout, a sinequanone condition for the efficiency of a lending of last 
resort. In this part, we will use a non parametric methodology, CART, in order to find thresholds 
that will be used as quantitative rules. 
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4-1 Using CART methodology for the determination of external, fiscal and financial  
vulnerability thresholds : 
We use data of 41 emerging countries for the period 1975- 2012. We get the debt crisis 
indicator from data provided by Standard and Poor’s as well as IMF lending Arrangements. A 
country is defined to be in debt crisis if it is classified as being in default by Standard and 
Poor’s, or if it has access to non concessional IMF financing in excess of 100% of quota 
(Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig, 2003). We used the definition of debt crisis because 
it represents the insolvency of a country that we have to distinguish from the illiquidity one. 
The intervention of the ILOR is in fact effective only in case of liquidity problems.  
According to Standard and Poor’s, a country is defined to be in default if the 
government fails to pay the principal and the interests of external bonds on due date. The 
problem with this definition is that it may not capture “quasi- defaults”, i.e cases when defaults 
were prevented thanks to an adjustment program and a large financial package from the IMF 
(Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig, 2003). We therefore complete information with data 
on IMF non concessional lending from the IMF’s Finance Department1.  Information collected 
is mainly related to loans approved, approval dates and the actual disbursements of the loans.  
Hence, our definition of a debt crisis includes actual defaults on debts, recorded by 
Standard and Poor’s as well as defaults that were prevented through a “substantial” financial 
support from the IMF. For Manasse & al., an IMF “substantial” loan is the one exceeding 100% 
of the country’s quota.  According to this definition, sixty- five (65) crisis episodes were 
identified:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Mainly Stand- By Arrangements (SBA) and Extended Fund Facility (EFF) lending. 
12 
 
Table 5- Debt Crises Episodes 1975- 2012 
Pays  Nombre de crises Nombre d'années en crise Episodes de crises (Entrée- Sortie) 
Argentina 3 20 1982-1994; 1995- 1996; 2001-2005 
Bolivia 2 15 1980-1985; 1986-1994 
Botswana 0 0  
Brazil 3 18 1983-1995; 1998-2000; 2001-2002 
Bulgaria 2 6 1990-1994; 1998 
Chile 2 9 1983- 1991 
China 0 0  
Colombia 0 0  
Costa Rica 0 0  
Czech Rep. 0 0  
Dominican Republic 1 25 1981- 2005 
Ecuador 3 18 1982- 1996; 1999-2001; 2008- 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1 2 1984- 1985 
El Salvador 1 17 1981- 1997 
Guatemala 2 2 1986; 1987 
Honduras 1 14 1981- 2004 
Hungary 0 0  
India 0 0  
Indonesia 2 6 1997- 2001; 2002 
Jamaica 3 17 1978-1980; 1981-1986; 1987- 1994 
Jordan 1 6 1989-1994 
Korea 2 6 1980- 1982; 1997- 1999 
Malaysia 0 0  
Mexico 2 12 1982- 1991; 1995- 1996 
Morocco 2 8 1983- 1984; 1986- 1991 
Pakistan 1 3 1998- 2000 
Panama 1 15 1983- 1997 
Paraguay 2 10 1986- 1993; 2003- 2004 
Peru 3 22 1976-1977; 1978-1981; 1983-1998 
Philippines 1 11 1983- 1993 
Poland 1 14 1981- 1994 
Romania 4 8 1981-1983; 1985-1987; 1989;1993 
South Africa 4 11 1976- 1978; 1985- 1988; 1989- 1990; 1993-
Sri Lanka 0 0  
Syrian Arab Republic 0 0  
Thailand 2 4 1981- 1982; 1997- 1998 
Tunisia 1 2 1991- 1992 
Turkey 2 9 1978-1983; 2000- 2002 
Uruguay 4 10 1983- 1986; 1987- 1988; 1990- 1992; 2003 
Venezuela, RB 4 14 1983- 1989; 1990- 1991; 1995- 1998; 2005 
Vietnam 2 14 1985- 1998 
    
TOTAL 65 348   
Sources: Standard & Poor’s, IMF Finance Department 
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We use Classification and Regression Tree (CART) methodology to identify potential 
non linear interactions between explanatory variables (see a brief presentation of the method in 
Appendix 4). The obtained tree classifies observations into two categories: “crisis- prone” and 
“not crisis prone” (see Table 6).  
 
4-2 Results (CART Analysis) :   
The dataset includes information on 41 emerging economies with market access for the 
period 1975 to 2012. We base the choice of the explanatory variables on Sustainability Geithner 
framework (2002). These variables will allow for studying external and fiscal sustainability as 
well as the soundness of financial sector (see Data Appendix).   
The results of the regression tree are shown in the Figure below, the oblongs show the 
various criteria dividing the sample while the squares are the final groups of homogenous 
observations. The tree algorithm classifies all observations into 17 final groups or nodes. Only 
eleven indicators are used to catalogue all observations: Debt/ Exports; Debt/ GDP; Inflation 
rate; Short term debt/ foreign reserves; Real GDP; Short term Interest payments/ GDP; M2/ 
GDP; US Interest rates; private credit growth; Public Debt/ GDP; Debt Service/ foreign 
reserves. We find variables belonging to the three sustainability levels, i.e external, fiscal and 
financial, as well as macro- economic variables, like growth and inflation rates.  
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Figure 1- Classification and Regression Tree of Debt Crises 
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As shown in the Figure 1, the first split is based on the Debt/ Exports ratio, indicating 
that debt is the most important signal of a forthcoming crisis, with the lowest noise-to-signal 
ratio of all 11 indicators (see Appendix 5). Then, those observations with a debt/ exports ratio 
exceeding 2.49 are classified on the right, those lower than 2.49 on the left. For those 
observations with a low debt ratio, the groups are further splitted on the basis of Debt/ GDP 
ratio; Inflation rate, Short term debt/ Foreign Reserves ratio; Short term Interest Payments/ GDP 
ratio; M2/ GDP ratio; Real GDP growth; US Interest rate; Private credit growth; Debt service/ 
Foreign reserves ratio; Public Debt/ GDP ratio and Debt Service/ Foreign Reserves ratio.  
The first classification criterion divides our sample into two branches: 
1- Episodes with substantial external debt, i.e exceeding 2.49 times the GDP. These 
episodes are classified on the right of the tree. The average probability of default 
reaches here 64.58% versus 39.71 for the whole sample; 
2- Episodes with lower external probability are classified on the left of the tree with a 
default probability falling to 29.34%. 
 
Table 6- Nodes’ Classification 
Nodes Default Probability Crisis prone 
N1 3.2% NO 
N2 0% NO 
N3 72% YES 
N4 2.4% NO 
N5 47.10% YES 
N6 3.30% NO 
N7 36.70% NO 
N8 63% YES 
N9 12.20% NO 
N10 45.90% YES 
N11 5.90% NO 
N12 60.40% YES 
N13 53.30% YES 
N14 4% NO 
N15 100% YES 
N16 81% YES 
N17 84.60% YES 
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The nodes 15, 16 and 17 seem to be the “perfect” combination for debt crisis occurrence. 
A high public debt, combined with a substantial external debt and an expansionary monetary 
policy (Node 15) leads inevitably to a default. Node 17 is associated with high inflation (more 
than 20%) and an external debt/ exports ratio exceeding 2.49. This level of external debt is also 
observed for node 16, combined moreover with a high service debt (exceeding 1.18 time the 
foreign reserves).    
Admittedly, the external debt level is huge for the three nodes (observations classified 
on the right). But the default seems to be imminent when debt problems are associated with 
fiscal or/ and financial problems (node 15) or bad fundamentals like a high inflation rate (node 
17). Even if an inflation rate exceeding 2% is not necessarily alarming, its interaction with a 
very high debt level leads to default.    
On the other hand, even a moderate debt level can lead to default. Node 3 is classified 
on the left of the tree (with a low debt ratio). However, it is associated with a very high default 
probability (72%). Here, the vulnerabilities come from liquidity problems, i.e a short term debt 
exceeding the foreign reserves associated with high short term interest payments.  
Node 5 is also classified on the left of the tree. However, it is associated with a quite 
high crisis probability (47%). In this case, crises are mainly due to liquidity problems (high debt 
and short term interest payments) combined with a monetary expansion and a very high external 
debt (exceeding 62% of the GDP). Similarly, crises classified in Node 8 mainly come from high 
inflation, low economic growth and high US interest rates.   
Hence, we can classify observations into “crisis- prone” and “not- crisis prone” ones. 
To do so, we assessed the default probability for the whole sample (39.7%). Then, observations 
of a particular node are classified as “crisis prone” (if its default probability exceeds the 
sample’s one); or “not crisis prone” otherwise.  
  
4-2-1 Classification of nodes : 
Now, we can classify the 17 nodes into groups. First, we can distinguish two main 
groups: “crisis prone” and “not crisis prone” nodes (Table 2). The first bloc can be broken up 
into three sub- groups: relatively sound nodes, nodes with liquidity problems and nodes 
characterized by solvency problems. We have indeed taken up the classification of Manasse, 
Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) seeing that it will help us to capture situations where IMF 
intervention would be optimal.  
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 First Group of Nodes : Relatively sound fundamentals:  
It consists in nodes classified as “not crisis prone”, i.e nodes 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9 11 and 14. 
Except for the Node 14, all observations classified in this group are associated with a moderate 
external debt, in terms of exports and GDP (respectively less than 2.49 and 0.85). Nodes 1, 2 
and 4 are associated with a very low inflation rate (less than 10%), combined with a reasonable 
short term debt (less than 1.46 of foreign reserves) for the Node 1, with low short term interest 
payments for Node 2, and even an external debt ratio lower than 62% of GDP (Node 4). 
Otherwise, and even Node 7 suffers from inflation problems, interaction with low interest rates 
(less than 6%) and limited private credit growth (less than 25%) has offset the negative effect 
of high inflation and weak growth (lower than 2%). Similarly, Node 9 takes advantage from a 
quite high growth rate and an external debt lower than 54% of the GDP.         
Node 14 seems to be an exception, in that it consists in the only group whose external 
debt is huge (more than 2.49 times the exports). However, the node 14 is not classified as « crisis 
prone ». In fact, only 4% of observations belonging to this node represent crisis episodes. This 
situation shows that a moderate inflation, associated with low debt service and weak long term 
public debt (in terms of GDP) appears to be sufficient to prevent crises, even if external debt is 
huge.  
 Second Group of Nodes : Liquidity problems 
It consists in observations classified within Nodes 3 and 5. In spite of moderate debt 
ratios, in terms of exports (less than 2.49) and GDP (less than 85%), the high level of short term 
debt in terms of GDP (more than 1.46) as well as short term interest payments exceeding the 
computed threshold have considerably increased crisis probability to 72% for Node 3.  
 
 Third Group of Nodes : Solvency Problems :  
This group is partly represented by Nodes 13, 15, 16 and 17, i.e all observations whose 
external debt exceeds 2.49 times the exports (on the right of the tree except for Node 14). All 
these nodes are associated with extremely high default probabilities, 80% in average (versus 
40% for the whole average). This high level is due to interaction between high debt ratios (Node 
13), monetary expansion associated with high long term public debt (Node 15), a high service 
debt (Node 16) or an unbridled inflation (Node 17).    
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However, Nodes 10 and 12, on the left of our classification tree, are also associated with 
solvency problems: an external debt ranging from 54% to 85% combined with an inflation rate 
exceeding 10% (Node 10); and an external debt in excess of 85% of GDP (Node 12).  
For both nodes, the external debt ratio in relation to exports remains under the threshold 
(2.49). However, the use of this ratio is questionable because of problems related to exports 
valuation. Hence, Debt/ Exports ratio can be under- estimated simply because of hikes in global 
prices, which can be temporary, and this despite of the presence of high external debt levels. 
  
 Fourth Group of Nodes : Pure Macro- economic problems : 
Node 8 does not exhibit any evident vulnerability due to liquidity or solvency problems. 
However, node 8 is associated with a high default probability (68%) and classified hence as 
“crisis prone”. Here, external debt is inferior to computed thresholds, but interaction with high 
inflation rate (more than 10%), a weak economic growth (less than 2%) and high American 
interest rates (exceeding 6%) leads to crises.    
    
4-2-2 Usefulness of this classification : 
This application has three advantages. First, the computed thresholds can be used by 
international financial institutions, like IMF, to supervise countries. Any exceedance from 
thresholds should lead the IMF to warn the country’s government.     
Second, this framework can play an important role in crisis prevention, in that if 
countries find themselves in a “not crisis prone” node, i.e nodes 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 14, 
default risk should be low. To be in these nodes, countries have to respect these nodes’ 
characteristics2.  These governments should hence carry out fiscal, external debt, monetary and 
financial policies that keep them within this safe zone.   
However, belonging to these nodes does not necessarily mean the absence of default 
risk. Admittedly, crisis probabilities are here low but they exist: this is the third purpose of this 
paper. In fact, any country out of the “red zone”, i.e our third group of nodes announcing 
solvency problems, is eligible to a financial support by the ILOLR, the IMF. According to the 
literature relative to LOLR, the latter should intervene only in case of liquidity crisis, never 
                                                          
2 Table of Nodes’ characteristics can be sent upon request. 
19 
 
solvency ones. Actually, the bailout of insolvent institutions never resolves their difficulties and 
leads to a waste of the lender’s resources. On the contrary, these institutions should be 
liquidated or restructured deeply. The same principle should be applied to countries: an 
insolvent country that finds itself in the third group of nodes cannot be bailout. In fact, financing 
is insufficient in case of insolvency; a deep structural adjustment should precede the financial 
support: this is the case of countries ineligible, or ex ante conditionality, suggested by the IMF 
to prevent and to manage crises. Indeed, any intervention of the IMF, in the form of international 
loans of last resort, will fail given that the ILOLR has not to manage a solvency crisis (Bagehot 
rules3).   
On the other hand, even if a country respects eligibility rules and finds consequently 
itself in the first, second or fourth group of nodes, he can face a crisis. But here, crises are not 
solvency ones, they may result from international contagion, liquidity or macroeconomic 
problems needing adjustment; one can note the absence of external debt problems here. Hence, 
a country belonging to one of these groups would be eligible to a bailout in external liquidity 
from the IMF. The fact that the country does not belong to red zone shows that he respects IMF 
ex ante conditionality.  
One should notice that the respect of eligibility criteria is not sufficient to prevent crises. 
However, it reduces default risk. In addition, a country which respects ex ante conditionality 
would be eligible to an ILOLR because of its solvency.  
To sum up, this framework would be suitable not only for countries, seeing that it 
reduces default risk, but also for international financial institutions which may play the ILOLR 
role (here the IMF). The setting of rules with well defined thresholds would not only help the 
IMF to capture optimal intervention zones but also to act promptly. Celerity of intervention 
would in fact reduce probability of contagion beyond country’s frontiers.  
The ex ante quantified conditionality framework that we propose is shown in the Table 
7.   
 
 
                                                          
3 The notion of LOLR dates from two centuries (Thornton, 1802; Bagehot, 1873). According to Bagehot, the 
LOLR corresponds to « freely lend, to temporary illiquid, but not insolvent, banks, at penalty rates ». The LOLR 
is the one who accepts to take on risks that others have refused, during highly uncertain circumstances (Aglietta 
and Denise, 2000). 
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Table 7- Suggested ex ante conditionality Framework 
 
 
Eligibility Rules 
Low Short term Debt  <= 1,46   Low external debt levels  (Debt/ GDP <= 0,85 And De bt / Exports  <= 2,49) 
Moderated Inflation <= 0,1 
Low Short Term Interest Payments (<= 0,00152) But High Short term Debt   (> 1,46) 
Low External debt levels (Debt/ GDP <= 0,85 A nd Debt / Exports  <= 2,49) Moderated Inflation <= 0,1 
Low Debt/ GDP ratio (<= 0,62) And Debt / Exports ratio (<= 2,49) 
High Short term Debt  (> 1,46)  And High Sho rt term Interest Payments (> 0,00152) 
High M2/GDP  ratio  > 0,36 Moderated Inflation <= 0,1 
Low Debt/ GDP ratio (<= 0,85) And  De bt/ Exports   ratio (<= 2,49) 
Low Private Credit (<= 0,25) 
Low US Interest Rates (<= 0,06) 
Low Real GDP Growth (<= 0,02) 
Very High Inflation > 0,10 
Low De bt/ GDP  ratio (<= 0,85) And  De bt/ Exports ratio <= 2,49 
Very High Private Credit (> 0,25) 
Low US Interest Rates <= 0,06 
Low Real GDP Growth <= 0,02 
Very High Inflation  > 0,10 
Low De bt/ GDP  ratio <= 0,54 And De bt/ Exports ratio <= 2,49 High Real GDP Growth > 0,02 
Very High Inflation  > 0,10 
Low De bt / Exports ratio <= 2,49 But High Debt/ GDP ratio (between 0,54 and 0,85) 
High M2/ GDP ratio > 0,41 
Real GDP Growth  > 0,02 
Very High Inflation > 0,10 
Low Debt service / Foreign Reserves  ratio  <= 1,18 But Very  High De bt/ Exports  ratio > 2,49 Low Public Debt / GDP ratio <= 1,72 
High M2/ GDP ratio > 0,28 
Inflation <= 0,20 
Low external debt levels (De bt/ GDP   <= 0,85 A nd De bt / Exports <= 2,49) 
But High Short Term Debt > 1,46 And High Shor t term Interest Payme nts > 0,00152 
Moderated Inflation <= 0,1 
Low M2/GDP <= 0,36 
0,62< High De bt / GDP ratio <= 0,85     But low De bt/ Exports ratio <= 2,49 
High Short term De bt  > 1,46 And High Shor t term Interest Payments > 0,00152 High M2/GDP > 0,36 
Moderated Inflation <= 0,1 
Low External Debt levels (De bt/ GDP  <= 0,85 And De bt / Exports <= 2,49) 
High US Interest Rates >  0,06 Low Real GDP Growth <= 0,02 
Very High Inflation  > 0,10 
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4- Conclusions : 
The ex ante conditionality framework developed in this paper is certainly quantitative, 
with well defined thresholds, but IMF intervention cannot be limited to these rigid numbers. It 
consists in a framework playing the role of a reference, not strict rules, like Maastricht Treaty. 
  
Admittedly, holding an eligibility framework will help the IMF to act promptly. 
However, interventions should not be automatic, obeying to pre- determined thresholds. 
Judgment turns out also to be a decisive factor. In addition, and except factors assessed in our 
classification, i.e fiscal and external sustainability as well as financial soundness, other elements 
may play a very important role, like political variables, used for example by Manasse, Roubini 
and Schimmelpfennig (2003). It can include political rights, civil freedom rights, political 
constraints, years of parliamentary and presidential elections or electoral system. In sum, these 
variables may represent a proxy of country’s political uncertainty. Unfortunately, we were 
unable to collect this type of data, gathered by organizations like Freedom House which studies 
democracy’s extent in the world.    
Beyond simple thresholds, eligibility analysis turns out to be a little bit more complex. 
Our framework would allow the IMF to assess more quickly countries eligibility, in terms of 
fiscal, external and financial sustainability. But admittedly we must consider other elements in 
assessing countries’ eligibility to potential bailouts: political environment, country’s 
commitment to disseminate data, mainly in the framework of Special Data Dissemination 
Standards (SDDS), Financial Stability Indicators (FSI) or the Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) suggested by the IMF.   
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Appendix 1 Episodes of Sudden stop  
Country Sudden stop Episodes 
 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Czech Republic 
Dominican Republic  
 
Equator 
 
Egypt 
El Salvador  
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
South Korea  
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
South Africa  
Sri Lanka 
Syria 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
 
 
1980- 1982- 1989- 1994- 2001- 2002- 2008- 2010- 2011 
1980- 1982- 1983- 1985- 1999- 2000- 2003- 2005- 2006 
1977- 1979- 1981- 1986- 1987- 1993- 1998- 2001- 2003 
1982- 1989- 1994- 2002- 2010- 2011 
1991- 1994- 1996- 2003- 2009- 2012 
1982- 1983- 1985- 1991- 1995- 1998- 2009 
 
1983- 1986- 1987- 1991- 1998- 1999 
1979- 1981- 1982- 1984- 1987- 1993- 1994- 1996- 2000- 2003- 2011- 2012 
1996- 1997- 2003 
1976- 1978- 1981- 1982- 1983- 1985- 1987- 1990- 1993- 1995- 1996- 2002- 2003- 2006-
2011  
1979- 1981- 1983- 1986- 1988- 1989- 1992- 1993- 1995- 1997- 1999- 2000- 2003- 2004- 
2005- 2006- 2011 
1983- 1987- 1990- 1999- 2002- 2003- 2006 
1977- 1979- 1982- 1983- 1984- 1985- 1987- 1990- 1991- 1996- 1999- 2000- 2001- 2004 
1979- 1980- 1982- 1984- 1986- 1988- 1990- 1992- 1994- 1995- 1999- 2002- 2004- 2005 
1976- 1978- 1981- 1982- 1983- 1985- 1986- 1988- 1989- 1991- 1995- 1996- 1998- 2000- 
2002- 2005- 2006- 2012 
2010- 2011 
1984- 1997- 1998- 2011 
1977- 1978- 1983- 1985- 1986- 1988- 1992- 1995- 1997- 1999- 2002- 2003- 2006 
1979- 1984- 1989- 1992- 1993- 1998- 2001- 2003- 2007 
1986- 1997 
1976- 1977- 1979- 1984- 1985- 1987- 1994- 1997- 1998- 1999- 2005- 2011 
1982- 1983- 1987- 1994- 1995- 1998- 1999- 2004- 2006- 2011 
1978- 1979- 1995- 2010 
1998- 2009 
1980- 1983- 1987- 1988- 1991- 2000- 2002- 2006 
1981- 1982- 1985- 1987- 1988- 1999- 2004- 2006 
1978- 1983- 1984- 1986- 1988- 1998- 2005- 2009 
1979- 1981- 1983- 1985- 1997- 1998- 2001- 2004-2011 
1994- 2009- 2011 
1988- 1993 
1985- 2009- 2010 
1983- 1984- 1988- 1990- 1992- 1995- 1996- 2001 
1989 
1982- 1985- 1986- 1992- 1997- 2006- 2007- 2011 
1979- 1983- 1985- 2007 
1988- 1991- 1994- 1998- 2001- 2006 
1981- 1983- 1984- 1985- 1988- 1987- 1990- 1991- 1995- 1996- 1998- 1999- 2001- 2002- 
2004- 2009 
1997- 1999- 2000 
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Appendix 2 Definitions and Sources of Variables 
   
I For the Sudden 
Stops episodes : 
 
-Financial Account KA 
- Rela GDP 
- Exchange rate  
- GDP Deflator  
lie bjd (IFS)  
WDI (World Bank)  
line ae (IFS) 
line 99 bip4 (IFS) 
II For the 
parameters :  
-Short term debt  
- Output Loss 
- Retrun on reserves r  
- Ten-Year American 
Treasury Bonds  
GDF (World Bank)  
WDI (World Bank) 
line 60C IFS (3- month T- Bill  rate)  
(IFS line 61) - federal fund rate (IFS line 60B) 
 
III- For the assessment of the sudden stop Probability π :  
Debt variables   -Short Term Debt (GDF) / GDP (WDI)  
-Public Debt (GDF) / GDP (WDI) 
Exchange Rates   
 
-Real exchange rate deviation vis-à-vis HP trend 
(Hodrick- Prescott) IFS line rf 
-Dummy variable for the exchange regime : 1 for fixed 
regime and 0 for floating one (Reinhart et Rogoff, 
2004, updated) ; 
International Trade   
 
-Trade openness : Exports (IFS line 70) + Imports (IFS 
line 71)/ GDP (WDI) 
-Terms of Trade growth (IFS line 74/ IFS line 75) 
American Interest Rates   
 
-US Treasury Bonds interest (IFS line 60C) 
-Interest rates change of US Treasury Bonds (IFS line 
60C) 
Financial Development :  
 
-Bank Deposits (IFS line 24 + 25) 
- Banks- CB : IFS (lines 22A+22B+22C+22D)/ 
(12A+12B+12C+12D) 
-M2 Multiplier: M2 (IFS line 34 + 35)/ M0 (IFS line 
14) 
-M2 / GDP (WDI) 
-M3 IFS line 59MC 
-Market Capitalization / GDP (Emergent Market 
DataBase) 
-Credit for Private Sector  IFS line 22D / GDP (WDI) 
Business cycle  -Real GDp Growth (WDI) 
                                                          
4 Except for Mexico and South Africa : we have used line 99 bir, IFS 
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 -Domestic Real Credit growth IFS line 32/ CPI IFS 
line 64 
Financial Account Openess  -Gross Capital inflows/ GDP: lines IFS 78bed, 78bgd, 
78bmd, 78bnd, 78bxd, 78bid ; 
-Total of gross capital inflows and outflows IFS 
78bdd, 78bfd, 78bkd, 78bld, 78bwd, 78bhd 
Stocks of foreign assets and liabilities  -Foreign Direct Investments (IFS line 78bed+ 78bdd) 
/ Liabilities Stocks   
-Foreign Liabilities (IFS line 16c + 26c + 4d)/ GDP 
(WDI) 
-Net Foreign Assets (IFS line 31n) / GDP (WDI) 
Other variables  
 
-Foreign Liabilities (IFS line 26c) / M2 (IFS line 34 + 
35) 
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Appendix 3- Variables used in CART  
Variables Source 
I-External Sustainability:  
Total External Debt / Exports (DEBT_X) GDF 
Total External Debt / GDP (DEBT_GDP) GDF 
Debt Service/ GDP (DEBTSERVICE_GDP)  
Debt Service / Foreign Reserves (DEBTSERVICE_RC) 
GDF 
GDF and WDI 
Short Term Interest Payments / GDP (IPST_GDP) GDF and WDI 
Short Term Debt/ Foreign Reserves (DCT_RC) GDF and WDI 
Exports (EXPORTS) GDF 
Current Account / GDP (CURRENT) GDF and WDI 
II- Fiscal Sustainability:  
Fiscal Deficit / GDP (FISCALCASH) GFS 
PPG/ PIB (PPG_GDP) GDF 
Public/ PIB (PUBLIC_GDP)  
III- Financial Sector Soundness :  
Credit to private sector (PRIVATECREDIT) IFS line 22D / GDP (WDI) 
M2/ GDP (M2_GDP)  WDI 
M2 Multiplier (MULTIM2)  IFS lines (34+35) /IFS line 14 
Bank Deposits (DEPOSITS) IFS lines (24+25) /IFS line 64 
Domestic Credit / GDP (DOMESTIC) (IFS line 52 / IFS line 64) / IFS 
line 99 
IV- Macroeconomic Variables :   
Domestic Currency Overvaluation (TCR) Real Exchange Rate deviation 
from HP (Hodrick- Prescott) filter  
International interest rates (USI) IFS line 60 / IFS line 64 
Real GDP growth (REALGDP) WDI 
Inflation rate (INF)  IFS line 64  
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Appendix 4: Presentation of the CART methodology 
The data mining concept is nowadays a popular tool of information management. It’s 
commonly used in many fields where decision taking is very important, mainly finance (credit 
scoring), loans management and financial forecasts.  
A clasSification and regression tree is a structure with the form of a tree, splitting a set of input 
observations, on the basis of certain features, into narrower sets. A decision tree stocks certain 
classification rules into branches nodes, in order to gather similar observations  of the sample 
in the same node (or leaf).  
CART has the advantage of intercepting all interaction effects existing between the different 
variables, mainly when such interactions represent very important determinants of crises 
occurrence. CART takes into account the non-linearities and the complementarity of explaining 
variables.  
This methodology has been recently used to detect companies failures (Williams, De Silva, 
1991 ; Hung and Chen, 2009) ; to intercept debt crises (Iscanoglu, Weber and Taylan, 2007 ;  
Manasse P, Roubini N. and Schimmelpfenning A., 2003), to classify financial crises 
(Kaminsky, 2006) to assess credit markets (Gabbi, Bocconi, Matthias and De Lerma, 2006), for 
credit scoring (Kočenda and Vojtek, 2009)…. 
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Appendix 5: Noise to Signal Ratio (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999) 
 
The noise- to-signal ratio can be defined using the matrix below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-If the indicator signals a crisis and there’s effectively a crisis within the 24 months following 
this signal (Cell A), the signal is considered exact ; 
-If the indicator signals a crisis but no crisis happens within the 24 months following this 
signal (Cell B), the signal is considered a false alert and called noise. 
Hence, a perfect signal belongs to cells A or D. 
The noise-to-signal ratio for any indicator is given by the number of entrees : 
 
An indicator with a high number of noises would have few entrees in A and D celles, but 
many ones in B and C. 
 
 
 
 Crisis happening within 
the 24 months  
No crises 
happening within 
the 24 months  
The indicator transmits a signal A B 
The indicator doesn’t transmit a 
signal 
C D 
 
